VASANTA SAMPAT DUPARE versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

22. Manoj (supra) was delivered against the backdrop of persistent concerns, catalogued, inter alia, in the 262nd Law Commission Report, about the inconsistency and inadequacy of death-penalty sentencing. Taking those concerns seriously, this Court devised a concrete procedural architecture imposing various obligations on State to protect the Rights of the accused. These requirements are not administrative niceties, but they exist to give substantive content to the constitutional mandate that punishment should be individually tailored and proportionate. Since Manoj (supra), an institutional practice has emerged whereby this Court routinely calls for the mandated reports before deciding appeals in capital punishment cases. As already noted, this Court has also taken suo-motu cognisance of the absence of a uniform trial-level framework and has referred the question to a Constitution Bench in Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1 of 2022. These developments confirm that the Manoj (supra) protocol has become an indispensable component of a “meaningful, real and effective” sentencing hearing.

23. The relief sought in the present writ is confined to securing the same procedural guarantee. The petitioner does not impugn the finding of guilt recorded in Criminal Appeal Nos. 2486-2487 of 2014 or the conclusions reached in Review Petition Nos. 637-638 of 2015. The petitioner is seeking a limited remand so that the sentencing Court may consider the reports and material envisaged in Manoj (supra). Any modification of the earlier judgments will be incidental to, and a necessary consequence of, supplying a constitutionally compliant procedure. In the present case, where the petitioner seeks only the enforcement of a procedural safeguard now recognised as integral to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, and where no [2025] 8 S.C.R.  Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. equally efficacious alternative remedy exists, the invocation of our extraordinary jurisdiction is both appropriate and justified. Plenary power to mould relief under Articles 32 and 142

24. This Court’s ability to grant effective relief is not exhausted by the formal confines of appellate review. On several occasions after Rupa Ashok Hurra (Supra), this Court has, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, revisited and modified its own final orders when the interests of justice so required. This was apparent in Sanjay Singh and another v U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad and another18, wherein this Court recalibrated its earlier directions on evaluation methodology, and Bilkis Yakub Rasool v Union of India and others19, in which this Court set aside a remission order by invoking both Articles 32 and 142 to protect fundamental rights developed after the original conviction. Moreover, in Supreme Court Bar Association v Union of India and another20, the Constitution Bench explained that the Court’s plenary powers are inherent and complementary to those conferred by statute and exist independent of those statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. The Bench emphasised that these constitutional powers permit this Court to craft remedies unrestrained by procedural or statutory limitations whenever necessary to uphold justice.

25. Consequently, it may be concluded that Article 32 of the Constitution of India is not restricted to reviewing decisions of subordinate courts or executive authorities. In exceptional situations it empowers this Court to revisit even its own final orders where doing so is necessary to prevent a continuing breach of fundamental rights. The controlling test is whether such intervention is required to avert manifest injustice under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, and technical rules of procedure cannot be permitted to thwart that constitutional mission.

26. Viewed through that lens, the Petitioner’s request for a new sentencing hearing which is compliant to Manoj (supra) falls squarely within Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The relief (2007) 3 SCC 720 (2024) 5 SCC 481 (1998) 4 SCC 409 2162 sought is narrowly tailored as it does not disturb the conviction or reopen evidentiary findings but merely insists that the ultimate penalty be imposed, if at all, through the procedural safeguards now recognised as integral to a fair and individualised sentence. We believe that granting this remedy is therefore a legitimate, and indeed compelling exercise of the Court’s plenary power under Article 32 of the Constitution of India to secure the effective enforcement of fundamental rights.

27. In the backdrop of the discussion above, we must also recognise the evolution of our own constitutional culture. Contemporary Indian society no longer conceives criminal punishment purely in retributive terms. It also measures the quantum of a sentence by its capacity to preserve the possibility of human reform. The goal of reformation, repeatedly affirmed in our jurisprudence, presupposes that the legal system will not foreclose the prospect of moral regeneration unless every procedural assurance of accuracy and fairness has first been scrupulously observed.

28. We cannot overlook that the machinery which feeds the death-penalty system is itself fragile. Investigations often rely on confessions extracted in opacity, recoveries whose provenance is contested and forensic material of doubtful rigour. When such evidence is filtered through an overburdened trial process, the possibility of wrongful conviction can never be dismissed as a remote abstraction. An irreversible penalty grafted onto a fallible process endangers the very core of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. At this juncture, we must state that Punishment in a constitutional democracy must ultimately reflect the moral trajectory of the society it serves. Over time, this Court has come to believe that every person, even one who has done great wrong, still carries a basic human dignity. This belief does not excuse crime but it simply means the State should keep open, wherever possible, the chance for an offender to change. It is our belief that moving from pure retribution to genuine reform is not an act of undue leniency but it is a statement of faith in the human capacity for improvement.

29. Modern penology reinforces that conviction. Empirical literature has yet to establish that the spectacle of an execution deters homicide more effectively than a sentence of incarceration for the natural span of life. What is clear, however, is that a death sentence [2025] 8 S.C.R.  Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. closes every door as it ends all hope of remorse, of reconciliation with victims’ families, and of uncovering mistakes that sometimes emerge only after many years. A just society may protect itself from serious crime, but it must do so with measures that can be clearly defended as both necessary and fair. Our Constitution therefore sets a very high bar before the State can take a life. We strongly believe that it is not enough to simply point to the horror of an offence. The process leading to a death sentence must itself be beyond reproach as it must also be open, thorough and fair. The safeguards laid down in Manoj (supra) are meant to ensure exactly that. Until those safeguards are fully applied, carrying out a death sentence would sit contrary to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India as they promise equality and fair procedure to every person in our society.

30. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed.

31. We therefore hold that Article 32 of the Constitution of India empowers this Court in cases related to capital punishment to reopen the sentencing stage where the accused has been condemned to death penalty without ensuring that the guidelines mandated in Manoj (supra) were followed. This corrective power is invoked precisely to compel rigorous application of the Manoj (supra) safeguards in such cases, thereby ensuring that the condemned person is not deprived of the fundamental rights to equal treatment, individualized sentencing, and fair procedure that Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India secure to every person.

32. We add, however, a word of caution. Article 32 of the Constitution of India is the bedrock of constitutional remedies, but its exceptional scope cannot be permitted to become a routine pathway for reopening concluded matters. Reopening will be reserved only for those cases where there is a clear, specific breach of the new procedural safeguards as these breaches are so serious that, if left uncorrected, they would undermine the accused person’s basic rights to life, dignity and fair process.

33. Accordingly, we further clarify that the finding of guilt recorded against the petitioner is left untouched. Nothing in this judgment shall be read as a comment, direct or implied, on the evidence that sustained conviction or on any defence that may have been raised at trial. Our intervention is strictly confined to the issue of sentence. 2164

34. The sentence of death affirmed by this Court on 03 May 2017 is, for the present, set aside, and the matter is remitted to this Court for a fresh hearing on sentence alone, to be conducted in conformity with the directions in Manoj (supra).

35. The Registry is directed to place the matter before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for assignment to an appropriate Bench.

36. All pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. Sanjay Karol, J.

37. I have perused the erudite opinion by my esteemed MyLord, Vikram Nath, J,. The scholarly lucidity with its empathetic and farsighted understanding of the Constitution and the values it espouses has prompted my whole-hearted concurrence. However, considering the peculiarity and the importance of the questions before us, I desire to pen down a few thoughts of my own. “For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed, and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense, together with the character and propensities of the offender. His past may be taken to indicate his present purposes and tendencies, and significantly to suggest the period of restraint and the kind of discipline that ought to be imposed upon him.” Justice Pierce Butler21

38. The crux of the petitioner’s case is that post his conviction and confirmation thereof, right up to this Court, meaning thereby that his sentence of being hanged till death was made certain, both judicially and on the part of the executive (with a Review Petition and Clemency Petitions both to the Hon’ble Governor and the Hon’ble President of India, being rejected), there have been judicial Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937) [2025] 8 S.C.R.  Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. developments by way of a three-Judge Bench decision in Manoj v. State of M.P.22, whereby this Court mandated the calling of certain reports, the content whereof has to be duly considered in arriving at a just and proper sentence, of which he claims benefit. In other words, the petitioner seeks directions from this Court to grant him the benefit of revisiting his sentence, in light of the procedure laid down in Manoj (supra).

39. This Court in Byluru Thippaiah v. State of Karnataka23 had recently observed that Manoj (supra) represented a watershed moment in the Indian sentencing regime. By way of the said judgment, this Court shone a path for individualised sentencing. Individualised sentencing, as the name suggests, is a judicial practice where the punishment awarded to an offender is crafted or moulded, acknowledging not just the crime but also the criminal. It may be so that an individual has committed a crime, but in modern penology, the same does not necessarily mean that a sentence can be imposed upon them in disregard of the background which may have led the offender to such a position. This is more so a case where the punishment to be meted out is afflicted by irreversibility, in other words, the death sentence. In doing so, this Court considers the offenders’ background – social, economic and psychological; personal history; character; and rehabilitation potential.

40. While Manoj (supra) is the first time that this Court has mandated calling of these reports in furtherance of the mitigating factors spelt out in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab24 the idea of individualised sentencing took root in Western jurisdictions much earlier. At this point, it has to be recognized that most Western countries have outlawed the death penalty, and as one of the, if not the only, notable exceptions, it shall be useful to notice a few decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States of America. 40.1 In Lockett v. Ohio25, the Court was confronted with a situation where the getaway driver, who was involved in a robbery (2023) 2 SCC 353 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1455 (1980) 2 SCC 684 438 US 586 (1978) 2166 that resulted in a murder, was found guilty and sentenced to death. The question before the Court was whether the Ohio statute requiring the death penalty for aggravated murder was violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution unless anyone of the following three criteria could be found – (i) that the victim had induced the offence; (ii) the same had been committed under duress or coercion; and (iii) the offence was a product of mental deficiencies. The Court held that restricting the mitigating factors only to the above three points did indeed violate the Constitution. It was held as follows : “There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases Governmental authority should be used to impose death. But a statute that prevents a sentencer in all capital punishment from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s character and record and to circumstances of the offence proffered in mitigation creates a risk that the death penalty would be imposed inspite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between life and death, the risk is unacceptable and incompatible…” 40.2 The Lockett doctrine, which is best captured in Penry v. Lynaugh26 to the effect that punishments must be directly related to the defendant’s personal culpability and that a defendant who commits crime(s) attributable to a disadvantaged background or emotional or mental problems may be less culpable than the one who has no such excuse, was furthered in Eddings v. Oklahoma27. The Court held the Trial Court to be in error for not having considered Eddings’ age (16 years) as a mitigating factor given his “violent background”. At trial, a State psychologist had also testified to the effect that he suffered from a sociopathic and anti-social personality disorder. 492 U.S. 302 (1989) 455 U.S. 104 (1982) [2025] 8 S.C.R.  Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. The Court found the Trial Court to be in error on this count as well. The majority held as follows : “Eddings was not a normal 16-year-old; he had been deprived of the care, concern and parental attention that children deserve. On the contrary, it is not disputed that he was a juvenile with serious emotional problems and had been raised in a neglectful, sometimes even violent, family background. In addition, there was testimony that Eddings’ mental and emotional development were at a level several years below his chronological age. All of this does not suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of murder, deliberately committed in this case. Rather, it is to say that, just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional disturbance of a youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing.” 40.3 In Skipper v. South Carolina28, the Court heard an appeal against a concurrently confirmed death sentence, where at the sentencing hearing, the learned Trial Judge denied the admission of mitigating evidence in the form of testimony of the two jailers and a regular visitor – who would have testified to the effect that he had adjusted well under incarceration in the seven and a half months that he had spent in prison between his arrest and trial. Both the Courts below held such evidence to be inadmissible and irrelevant. Such findings were vacated and it was held that it was not open for the sentencer to refuse consideration of any of the “relevant mitigating evidence.” In the concurring opinion, it was observed that all relevant factors should be considered at the stage of the Subordinate Courts themselves, as opposed to being considered by the Supreme Court, for it has no special expertise in deciding the appropriateness of factors to be considered or otherwise. 476 U.S 1 (1986) 2168 40.3 Graham v. Collins29 was a case where the Court was dealing with a case of first-degree murder. The sentence of death imposed was confirmed by the Supreme Court, but in doing so, it was observed that the same could be arrived at, as per the guidance given by the Texas statute in question, giving ‘constitutionally adequate’ considerations to factors such as age. 40.4 In Tennard v. Dretke30, the Court rejected two tests applied by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, where they, in order to consider the factum of his low IQ, applied two tests, i.e., of ‘nexus’ to the crime and a test for ‘uniquely severe permanent handicap’, observing thus : “Reasonable jurists could conclude that the low IQ evidence Tennard presented was relevant mitigating evidence. Evidence of significantly impaired intellectual functioning is obviously evidence that “might serve ‘as a basis for a sentence less than death,’” Skipper, 476 U. S., at 5; see also, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U. S. 510, 535 (2003) (observing, with respect to individual with IQ of 79, that “Wiggins[‘] … diminished mental capacitie[s] further augment his mitigation case”); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U. S. 776, 779, 789, n. 7 (1987) (noting that petitioner “had an IQ of 82 and functioned at the level of a 12-year-old child,” and later that “[i]n light of petitioner’s youth at the time of the offense, … testimony that his ‘mental and emotional development were at a level several years below his chronological age’ could not have been excluded by the state court” (quoting Eddings, 455 U. S., at 116)). Reasonable jurists also could conclude that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ application of Penry to the facts of Tennard’s case was unreasonable. 506 U.S 461 (1993) 2004 SCC OnLine US SC 59 [2025] 8 S.C.R.  Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. The relationship between the special issues and Tennard’s low IQ evidence has the same essential features as the relationship between the special issues and Penry’s mental retardation evidence. Impaired intellectual functioning has mitigating dimension beyond the impact it has on the individual’s ability to act deliberately. See Penry I, 492 U. S., at 322. A reasonable jurist could conclude that the jury might well have given Tennard’s low IQ evidence aggravating effect in considering his future dangerousness, not only as a matter of probable inference from the evidence but also because the prosecutor told them to do so: “[W]hether he has a low IQ or not is not really the issue. Because the legislature, in asking you to address that question, the reasons why he became a danger are not really relevant. The fact that he is a danger, that the evidence shows he’s a danger, is the criteria to use in answering that question.” App. 60. Indeed, the prosecutor’s comments pressed exactly the most problematic interpretation of the special issues, suggesting that Tennard’s low IQ was irrelevant in mitigation, but relevant to the question whether he posed a future danger.” 40.5 The above discussion by no means is meant to be an extensive deliberation of how the mitigating factors, eventually recognised by this Court in Manoj (supra), came to be considered in other jurisdictions. It is only meant to be indicative of the processes followed in a developed or developing Country that is retentionist31 qua the death penalty, which in all, are fifty four. Across the world, there are fifty-four countries that still have capital punishment on their statute books. In Africa- Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Lesotho, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda. In Asia- Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Myanmar, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, Yemen. In Europe- Belarus. In North America- Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America. In South America- Guyana. [See: Death Penlty Information Center: https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/policy/international/ abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries 2170

41. It is also to be noted that academic discourse32 argues for principles of individualised sentencing to be extended to non-capital felony convictions, i.e., serious crimes for which punishments other than death have been prescribed. This has been argued, keeping in view the effect that convictions for such serious offences may have on the person so convicted, causing “dehumanizing effects” that extend far beyond release from incarceration, such as the loss of right to vote, housing and employment and most obviously, social stigma. This extension would grant three benefits – I. Grant each defendant an effective opportunity to present circumstances for and against his case; II. Enhance transparency and further proportionality; and III. Restore sentencing discretion to neutral Tribunals and respect for offender dignity. Academic discourse is the birthplace of nuanced ideas that have great potential to inform and influence legislative policy and judicial action. Examples are aplenty of such influence. Even in the United States, where this discussion is taking shape, concrete steps are yet to be taken in so far as the extension of consideration of the mitigating factors in non-capital felony offences. However, as we have noticed above, the consideration of these factors in offences with capital punishment is well established. If the boundaries of theoretical discussions have extended so far ahead, it would only stand to reason that the judicial fora would at least extend these benefits to cases where the alternative is the State-sanctioned taking away of a person’s life. This is more so because the commission of an offence is not a stand-alone incident, but rather the culmination of a sum total of circumstances that would have driven the offender to commit such a crime. For Courts to close their eyes to this possibility is the gravest form of injustice that can be caused by the stroke of a pen.

42. In general perception, the image of convicts on death row is most uncharitable and hostile, and to perceive dignity for them may appear to some as an unjust concession to the most undeserving. The law, however, does not permit such perceptions. The rights available to a free person walking the streets are also to some extent available William W. Berry, Individualized Sentencing, 76 Wash.& Lee L. Rev.13 (2019). [2025] 8 S.C.R.  Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. to those who are confined behind bars, inasmuch as the same has been recognized, for instance, in cases where, despite the rejection of mercy petitions, the executions of these persons remain pending for years. This, it has been held, is violative of the prisoners’ rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 21, as we are well aware, provides that no person will be deprived of their life and liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law. When a person has been sentenced to death, and the same has been confirmed on appeal, the deprivation of liberty is in accordance with law, but even then, some aspects of Article 21 would still be with such a prisoner.

43. Dignity, which is essential to the ‘life’ and well-recognised to be something more than a mere animal existence, is one such right [See: Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India33]. There may be, on an ideal plane, opposition to this recognition, given that this implies dignity is inherent in even those who have been convicted of having committed the most barbaric of acts – but that is true. So long as a person is living, he is entitled to dignity. Immanuel Kant34, who is recognized as the modern proponent of the understanding of dignity, observed thus : “Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human beings and is in turn bound to respect every other. Humanity itself is a dignity; for a human being cannot be used merely as a means by any human being … but must also be used at the same time as an end. It is just in this that his dignity … consists, by which he raises himself above all other beings in the world that are not human beings and yet can be used, and so over all things.”

44. During the Second World War, one of the ghastliest acts against humanity was perpetrated, where a section of the population was wiped out merely on account of their ethnicity and religious beliefs in an attempt to cleanse a particular race. Fresh out of the war when (2018) 10 SCC 1 Kant, I. (2017). Kant: The Metaphysics of Morals. (M. Gregor, Trans., L. Denis, Ed.) (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2172 the Member States of the United Nations convened to set down the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they were aware of the vast differences amongst them and yet found common ground on the idea of dignity35. As a result, the first Article of the Declaration itself states that all persons are born equal in rights and dignity.

45. One form of dignity is the “non-instrumentalization of persons”, which means viewing offenders as individual human beings. In the realm of punishment, this humane view of offenders entails proportionality and humanness. A detailed exposition is not warranted for the principle of proportionality, save and except to say that the punishment awarded to an offender has to be directly related to the offence committed. The second aspect of humaneness entails that the punishment so awarded should not be outside the bounds of human decency36. All these aspects circle back to our constitutional values embodied in Articles 14 and 21. The words of Ramaswamy, J., in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab37, are instructive: “The foundation of Indian political and social democracy, as envisioned in the preamble of the Constitution, rests on justice, equality, liberty, and fraternity in secular and socialist republic in which every individual has equal opportunity to strive towards excellence and of his dignity of person in an integrated egalitarian Bharat. Right to justice and equality and stated liberties which include freedom of expression, belief and movement are the means for excellence. The right to life with human dignity of person is a fundamental right of every citizen for pursuit of happiness and excellence. Personal freedom is a basic condition for full development of human personality. Article 21 of the Constitution protects right to life which is the most precious right in a civilised society. The trinity i.e. liberty, equality and fraternity always blossoms and enlivens the flower of human dignity.” M.Nussbaum, Human Dignity & Political entitlements, in Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics 360 (2008). M.J.Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the backdrop of the Eight Amendment, (2016) U.ILL L.REV.2129. (1994) 3 SCC 569 [2025] 8 S.C.R.  Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. The question that is to be considered is whether the rights under Article 21 of the instant petitioner and the other similarly placed convicts, who would be benefitted by the retrospective application of Manoj (supra), would be harmed and their dignity threatened if this particular aspect is seen only from the angle of a subsequent development, as it would defeat the noble purpose of individualized sentencing put forth in Manoj (supra) and the mitigating factors that could possibly be brought on record by the instant petitioner, will be left untouched and unexplored. There is no constitutional permissibility to give a go-by to the sacrosanct right under Article 21, on the basis that the judgment which benefits the petitioner and other similarly placed persons was delivered after the finality of conviction and sentence of the persons was determined.

46. According to Blackstonian theory38, the role of the Court is not to create new laws but to uphold and explain existing ones. Judges are seen as discovering or interpreting the correct law rather than making law themselves; the law is considered to have always existed as it is. Therefore, if a later judgment departs from an earlier one, it does not introduce a new law but rather uncovers the true legal principle, which then applies retrospectively. Salmond echoes this view, explaining that case law operates on the premise that Judges merely declare the law. He wrote : “[T]he theory of case law is that a judge does not make law; he merely declares it; and the overruling of a previous decision is a declaration that the supposed rule never was law. Hence any intermediate transactions made on the strength of the supposed rule are governed by the law established in the overruling decision.” To put it otherwise, when a previous decision is overruled, it means the earlier rule was never truly the law, and all actions taken based on that supposed rule are subject to the new, correct legal determination, except in cases that are already finally decided (res judicata) or where accounts have already been settled. Thus, overruling a decision has a retrospective effect, clarifying what the law always was, with limited exceptions. 15th Ed. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 2174

47. The Blackstonian theory has found application by this Court on few occasions. In CIT v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd39, C.K. Thakker, J. explained the theory in the following terms: “35. In our judgment, it is also well settled that a judicial decision acts retrospectively. According to Blackstonian theory, it is not the function of the court to pronounce a “new rule” but to maintain and expound the “old one”. In other words, Judges do not make law, they only discover or find the correct law. The law has always been the same. If a subsequent decision alters the earlier one, it (the later decision) does not make new law. It only discovers the correct principle of law which has to be applied retrospectively. To put it differently, even where an earlier decision of the court operated for quite some time, the decision rendered later on would have retrospective effect clarifying the legal position which was earlier not correctly understood.” [See also: Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Raj Kumar Arora40.]

48. Courts in other jurisdictions have also held judgments to have a retrospective effect. The inimitable Justice Holmes in his dissent in Barton Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.41, observed : “ “35. … I know of no authority in this Court to say that, in general, State decisions shall make law only for the future. Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years.”

49. The Supreme Court of Canada in Attorney General of Canada v. George Hislop42, has held that : “86. However, this acknowledgement does not require abandoning Blackstone’s declaratory approach altogether. (2008) 14 SCC 171 2025 SCC Online SC 819 1910 SCC OnLine US SC 2 2007 SCC OnLine Can SC 10 [2025] 8 S.C.R.  Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. The critique of the Blackstonian approach applies only to situations in which judges are fashioning new legal rules or principles and not when they are applying the existing law. In instances where courts apply pre-existing legal doctrine to a new set of facts, Blackstone’s declaratory approach remains appropriate and remedies are necessarily retroactive. Because courts are adjudicative bodies that, in the usual course of things, are called upon to decide the legal consequences of past happenings, they generally grant remedies that are retroactive to the extent necessary to ensure that successful litigants will have the benefit of the ruling…”

50. Building on the Blackstonian theory and Salmond’s explanation that the Courts do not create new law but merely declare what the law has always been, so that any overruling by a subsequent decision operates retrospectively, this understanding is directly relevant for the interpretation of Manoj (supra) with regard to its retrospective or prospective application. The question whether Manoj (supra) applies prospectively or retrospectively deeply affects the protection of Article 21 rights. If Courts deny petitioners the benefit of new legal developments solely because these emerged from later rulings, it could jeopardize the fundamental rights. In this vein, the decision in Kanishk Sinha & Anr v. State of West Bengal & Anr.43 affirms that, while statutes operate prospectively, unless expressly stated, judgments of constitutional Courts are presumed to be retrospective unless the Court expressly limits their effect. This alignment of legal principles bolsters the understanding that judicial declarations usually operate retrospectively, ensuring that the benefits of such rulings generally reach past cases unless specifically restricted. This continuity in judicial philosophy upholds fairness by protecting individual rights regardless of the timing of the judgment.

51. This case has presented two questions for consideration – one, regarding the retrospective application of the principles in Manoj (supra) which stands answered as above; and second, being the applicability and maintainability of Article 32 of the Constitution of 2025 SCC Online SC 443 2176 India, the thornier of the afore-mentioned issues after the rejection of the mercy petitions preferred before the Hon’ble President of India and the Hon’ble Governor of Maharashtra.

52. Article 32 of the Constitution of India provides that this Court has the power to issue prerogative writs in favour of the applicant before it, should they succeed in establishing a violation of a right under Part III of the Constitution. The natural corollary that the petitioner would have to show that some or the other right available to him, which is enshrined under Part III stands violated. The case of the petitioner, accordingly, is that the denial of the sentencing procedure as established in Manoj (supra) violates his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution.

53. What this necessarily implies is that the law declared by this Court in Manoj (supra) has acquired such a status that the non-availability thereof to the petitioner prejudices him greatly. This Court has, time and again in the interpretation of various legislations, national and international, declared the law as it should be in accordance with Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Similarly, in Manoj (supra), in my view, all that has been done is that a streamlined and time- bound process has been laid down, to be necessarily followed by the Courts below, which hitherto had not been done despite postulation in Bachan Singh (supra).

54. If the law once declared is not followed and the same causes a demonstrable detriment to a person, or in this case, a convict, such person will have a legitimate grievance which the Courts would be then required to remedy. As already observed in the preceding paragraphs, the law declared by the constitutional Courts applies retrospectively. Ex-consequenti, the benefit of Manoj (supra) applies to the petitioner retrospectively and the denial of such benefit, which may eventually have the effect of saving him from the hangman’s noose, if it is indeed found that his socio-economic and psychological background as also other mitigating factors as may be procured, did play a sufficient role in the petitioner committing the heinous crime that he did, non-consideration of these factors would constitute a violation of Article 21, since the effect thereof would be that his life would be eventually taken away. [2025] 8 S.C.R.  Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors.

55. The substance of the Union’s and the State’s opposition to this writ petition was that Article 32 cannot be permitted to be invoked post conclusion of the process as is provided under law, in an effort to disturb findings already made and confirmed. There is also an apprehension that if this Court permits the exercise of powers under Article 32 in this case, it would also give other convicts similarly condemned an avenue for re-agitation, even after dismissal of the review petition. While the apprehension of the Union of India and the State appears somewhat justified, which we will deal with subsequently, the contention regarding the maintainability of Article 32 does not merit acceptance.

56. This is evident from a bare perusal of Part III of the Constitution. The framers have consciously placed a pathway to this Court into the heart and soul of the Constitution, ensuring and guaranteeing that no person, for whatever reason, can be denied an avenue to have their grievance redressed, when some action of the State infringes on the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution of India. The guaranteed right to approach this Court was considered, and rightly so, fundamental to the protection of the fundamental rights by the framers of the Constitution themselves. Illustratively, certain extracts of the discussion on draft Article 25 are reproduced herein below : “G. Durgabai- Sir, the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of a person’s rights is a very valuable right that is guaranteed under this Constitution. In my view this is a right which is fundamental to all the fundamental rights guaranteed under this Constitution. The main principle of this article is to secure an effective remedy to the fundamental rights guaranteed under this Constitution. As we are all aware, a right without an expeditious and effective remedy serves no purpose at all, nor is it worth the paper on which it is written. Therefore, as I have already stated, this article secures that kind of advantage that it will ensure the effective enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed to a person.44 Constituent Assembly Debates, Official Report, Vol. VII (4 November 1948), at 3–5 (India). 2178 Jerome D Souza- Sir, it is because we all believe,–and that is the implication of this chapter of fundamental Rights,–that man has certain rights that are inalienable, that cannot be questioned by any humanly constituted legislative authority, that these Fundamental Rights are framed in this manner and a sanction and a protection given to them by this provision for appeal to the Supreme Court. Sir, if all our people and their outlook were entirely materialistic, if right and wrong were to be judged by a majority vote, then there is no significance in fundamental rights and the placing of them under the protection of the High Court. It is because we believe that the fullest and the most integral definition of democracy includes and is based upon this sacredness of the individual, of his personality and the claims of his conscience, that we have framed these rights.45” (Emphasis supplied) The Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constitution, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar also highlights the high pedestal upon which this Article rests. This Court in Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union of India46, speaking through Y.V. Chandrachud, CJI, noticed this statement as follows : “A right without a remedy is a legal conundrum of a most grotesque kind. While the draft Article 25, which corresponds to Article 32, was being discussed in the Constituent Assembly, Dr Ambedkar made a meaningful observation by saying: “If I was asked to name any particular article in this Constitution as the most important — an article without which this Constitution would be a nullity — I could not refer to any other article except this one. It is the very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it and I Constituent Assembly Debates, Official Report, Vol. VII (4 November 1948), at 8–10 (India). (1981) 1 SCC 568 [2025] 8 S.C.R.  Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. am glad that the House has realised its importance. [ Constituent Assembly Debates, December 9, 1948, Vol. VII, p. 953]” Here itself, to further supplement the indispensability of Article 32, it is reiterated that this Article forms the Basic Structure of the Constitution of India and as a consequence thereof, its essence cannot be taken away even by the exercise of the powers of the Parliament. This Court has also struck down legislation as ultra vires the Constitution in cases where this power has been sought to be circumscribed. Paragraph 99 of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India47 reads as under : “The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court …” (Emphasis supplied) As is made evident from the above extract, the framers of the Constitution held a deeply regarded belief that certain rights are inalienable and most precious to a person, and for the enforcement of these rights that the doors of this Court were kept open for all. It is well-established that reference to the Constitutional Assembly debates can be made in the interpretation of a constitutional provision. [See: S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab & ors.48; and (1997) 3 SCC 261 (2001) 7 SCC 126 2180 K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India49.] It becomes but obvious then, that nothing whatsoever under the law can cast a shadow or eclipse this right, whether it be the availability of a substantive alternate remedy or procedural wrangles. In the present case, since this Court has confirmed the petitioner’s conviction, and review was also dismissed, he has no other avenue other than this Court where he may seek the benefit of the principles in Manoj (supra). It is almost impossible to conceive that the remedy under this Article would be foreclosed to the petitioner when Article 21 is the only thing that stands between the petitioner and the rope of death, only in order to underscore and emphasize the finality of a judicial determination, which in all cases apart from such exceptional circumstances, is a cardinal principle to be abided by.

57. As for the argument of the learned Advocate General for the State of Maharashtra that after dismissal of a review petition, the only available path is that of the curative petition, the same is difficult to accept for the Constitution Bench in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra50 itself states that this jurisdiction is to be exercised only in those cases where the circumstances permit the finality of a judicial decision to be altered with. Para 42 reads as under : “42. The concern of this Court for rendering justice in a cause is not less important than the principle of finality of its judgment. We are faced with competing principles — ensuring certainty and finality of a judgment of the Court of last resort and dispensing justice on reconsideration of a judgment on the ground that it is vitiated being in violation of the principles of natural justice or giving scope for apprehension of bias due to a Judge who participated in the decision-making process not disclosing his links with a party to the case, or on account of abuse of the process of the court. Such a judgment, far from ensuring finality, will always remain under the cloud of uncertainty. Almighty alone is the dispenser of absolute justice — a concept which is not disputed but by a few. We are of (2019) 1 SCC 1 (2002) 4 SCC 388 [2025] 8 S.C.R.  Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. the view that though Judges of the highest court do their best, subject of course to the limitation of human fallibility, yet situations may arise, in the rarest of the rare cases, which would require reconsideration of a final judgment to set right miscarriage of justice complained of. In such case it would not only be proper but also obligatory both legally and morally to rectify the error. After giving our anxious consideration to the question, we are persuaded to hold that the duty to do justice in these rarest of rare cases shall have to prevail over the policy of certainty of judgment as though it is essentially in the public interest that a final judgment of the final court in the country should not be open to challenge, yet there may be circumstances, as mentioned above, wherein declining to reconsider the judgment would be oppressive to judicial conscience and would cause perpetuation of irremediable injustice.” (Emphasis supplied)

58. The upshot of the above discussion is that Article 32 has pride of place – a Jewel on the Crown of the Justice Delivery System – in the Indian Constitutional scheme and is unquestionably available to even those who are serving sentences for the most heinous offences. Given that Manoj (supra) was not in operation or did not exist at the time when the present petitioner was sentenced and his review was dismissed, no other recognized way was available to him to approach this Court seeking benefit thereof. It has already been held that judicial pronouncements apply retrospectively and so a right was conferred upon him to have his sentence re-examined in the light of materials gathered under the principles of Manoj (supra), it is to exercise such a right which has a direct impact on his Article 21 rights that a petition under Article 32 had to be preferred. It, therefore, has to be necessarily held to be maintainable.

59. The end result of this petition being held maintainable is not meant to give a way out to persons convicted under a procedure established by law to approach this Court seeking to reopen the conclusions arrived at properly or simply to hide behind ongoing litigation in order to delay the inevitable carrying out of the sentence. Such a 2182 petition has been held to be maintainable in the specific facts of this case, where a subsequent development in law granted a benefit to a convict, and there was no other avenue available to him. We are informed that in all, there are only 7 such convicts, sentenced to be hanged, seeking the benefit of Manoj (supra). Result of the case: Writ petition allowed. †Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain