Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
20. Summarising the principles when review will be maintainable and review will not be maintainable following was held in paragraphs 20.l and20.2: "20.1. When the review will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him: VIKRAM SINGH @VICKY WALIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.] (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words "any other sufficient reason" have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neid AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526 to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.(2013) 8 SCC 337. 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: . (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. c (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the D original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived. "
21. In view of above, it is clear that scope, ambit and parameters of review jurisdiction are well defined. Normally in a criminal proceeding, review applications cannot be entertained except on the ground of error H A apparent on the face of the record. Further, the power given to this Court under Article 137 is wider and in an appropriate case can be exercised to mitigate a manifest injustice. By review application an applicant cannot be allowed to re-argue the appeal on the grounds which were urged at the time of the hearing of the criminal appeal. Even ifthe B applicant succeeds in establishing that there may be another view possible on the conviction or sentence of the accused that is not a sufficient ground for review. This Court shall exercise its jurisdiction to review only when a glaring omission or patent mistake has crept in earlier decision due to judicial fallibility. There has to be error apparent on the face of the record leading miscarriage of justice to exercise the review jurisdiction C under Article 137 read with Order 40 Rule 1. There has to be a material error manifest on the face of the record with results in the miscarriage of the justice.
22. In view of parameters of the review jurisdiction as noticed above, we now proceed to examine the review petition to find out as to D whether there are sufficient grounds as enumerated above for reviewing the judgment of the criminal appeal affirming the death sentence awarded to the applicants.
23. Learned counsel contended that the tape-recorded conversation has been relied on without there being any certificate under Section 658 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It was contended that audio tapes are recorded on magnetic media, the same could be established through a certificate under Section 658 and in the absence of the certificate, the document which constitutes electronic record, cannot be deemed to be a valid evidence and has to be ignored from consideration. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on the judgment of this Court in Anvar P. V. vs. P.K. Basheerand others, (2014) JOSCC 473. The conversation on the landline phone of the complainant situate in a shop was recorded by the complainant. The same cassette containing conversation by which ransom call was made on the landline phone was handed over by the complainant in original to the Police. This Court in its judgment dated G 25.01.2010 has referred to the aforesaid fact and has noted the said fact to the following effect: "The cassette on which the conversations had been recorded on the landline was handed over by Ravi Verma to S.J. Jiwan Kumar and on a replay of the tape, the conversation was clearly audible and was heard by the Police. " VIKRAM SINGH@
24. The tape recorded conversation was not secondary evidence A which required certificate under Section 65B, since it was the original cassette by which ransom call was tape-recorded, there cannot be any dispute that for admission of secondary evidence of electronic record a certificate as contemplated by Section 65B is a mandatory condition. In Anvar P. V. (supra) this Court had laid down the above proposition in paragraph 22. However, in the same judgment this Court has observed that the situation would have been different, had the primary evidence was produced. The conversation recorded by the complainant contains ransom calls was' relevant under Section 7 and was primary evidence which was relied on by the complainant. In paragraph 24 of the judgment · of this Court in Anvar P. V. it is categorically held that if an electronic record is used as primary evidence the same is admissible in evidence, without compliance with the conditions in Section 65B.
Paragraph 24 is as extracted below: "24. The situation would have been different had the appellant adduced primary evidence, by making available D in evidence, the CDs used for announcement and songs. Had those CDs used for objectionable songs or announcements been duly got seized through the police or Election Commission and had the same been used as primary evidence, the High Court could have played the same in court to see whether the allegations were true. That is not the situation in this case. The speeches, songs and announcements were recorded using other instruments and by feeding them into a computer, CDs were made therefrom which were produced in court, without due certification. Those CDs cannot be admitted in evidence since the mandatory requirements of Section 65-B of the Evidence Act are not satisfied. It is clarified that notwithstanding what we have stated herein in the preceding paragraphs on the secondary evidence of electronic record with reference to Sections 59, 65-A and 65-B of the Evidence Act, if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under . G Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible _in evidence, without compliance with the conditions in Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. "
25. He has further contended that on the plain reading of the Chemical Examiner's report, it is clear that the death was caused due to [2017) 8 S.C.R. A overdose of chloroform and pentazocine poisoning. Hence, the conviction ought to have been under Section 304A !PC and not under Section 302 lPC. The conviction against the applicants under Section 302 and 364A was recorded after considering entire evidence on record. This Court while dismissing the criminal appeals and affirming the death Reference B No.I has appreciated the entire evidence and approved the decision of the trial court and the High Court. The conviction of the applicant was based on cogent, ocular and medical evidence and in the review application applicants have again asked this Court to re-appraise the evidence and come to a different conclusion. There is no apparent error on the face of the record in recording conviction of the applicants under Section 302 C and364A.
26. It is further contended that this Court had relied on the disclosure statement of Jasvir Singh, which led to the recovery of the dead body which disclosure statement does not connect Vikram Singh with the crime. The trial court as well as the High Court marshaled the D ocular evidence by which evidence role ofVikram Si.ngh was duly proved in commission of crime. Hence, this submission deserves to be rejected.
27. Lastly, Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior counsel submits that this Court in paragraph 18 has recorded its conclusion that the finger prints of Vikram Singh were found on the Alto and Chevrolet cars, therefore, connection of Vikram Singh is established in the crime. It is submitted that since this Court recorded at para 18 that the said cars belong to Vikram Singh, the existence of finger prints cannot by itself be of any significance with regard to his culpability in the crime. It is submitted that by relying on finger prints, this Court had committed an apparent erroron the face of the record. The above submission ofleamed counsel is misconceived and incorrect. In para 18 of the judgment this Court never observed that Alto and Chevrolet cars belonged to Vikram Singh. The statement of facts made in para 18 was to the effect that the finger prints from the Alto and Chevrolet cars belong to Vikram Singh and Jasvir Singh respectively. It is useful to extract below para 18 of the G judgment: "18. We also find that the prosecution has been able to show that the finger prints lifted by the Police Officers from the Alto and Chevrolet cars belonged to Vikram Singh and jasvir Singh respectively. It is significant that the Chloroform bottle recovered from Darshan Kaur s residence was also examined VIKRAM SINGH @ and the thumb impression of Jasvir Singh was detected A thereon."
28. There is evidence of the owner of Alto car, PW.3, Naresh Kumar Sharma who had stated in his statement that the car was lent by him to Vikram Singh in the morning of 141h February, 2005 at about 7 a.m. to 7.30 a.m. Thus, it was no one's case that Alto car belonged to Vikram Singh. The argument raised by Shri K.T.S. Tutsi is misconceived and we unhesitatingly repel the same.
29. Learned counsel has further contended that present was not a case where death penalty could have been awarded to the applicants. In the review petition reliance has been placed by the applicants on c Constitution Bench judgment in Bachan Si11gh vs. State of Pu11jab, (1980) 2 SCC 684, and judgment in Machhi Singh a11d others vs. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470. This Court in its judgment dismissing the appeals referred to Bacha11 Singh and Machhi Si11gh and has categorically applied its mind to various parameters laid down in the aforesaid judgments and on the broad principle which emerged from the judgments for evaluating the category of the rarest of the rare case. Various mitigating and aggravated factors which have been noted in the judgment of the High Court were referred to by this Court, and this Court recorded its conclusion that balance-sheet has been drawn by the High Court of aggravating and mitigating circumstances which was duly adopted by this Court. We do not find any error apparent on the record in the above consideration by this Court in affirming the judgment of the High Court.
30. Learned counsel appearing for Jasvir Singh adopted the submissions of Shri K.T.S. Tulsi on legal issues and on the question of F sentence. Certain other submissions have been raised on behalf of the second applicant which also do not disclose any ground which can be said to be a valid ground for exercising review jurisdiction.
31. We, after carefully considering the submissions of the applicants, are of the considered opinion that submissions raised in the review petitions do not raise any ground for review of judgment of this Court dated25.0l.2010.
32. In the result, the review applications are rejected. Nidhi Jain Review applications rejected.