Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
11. In Slate of UP. v. MK. Anthony, AIR (1985) S.C. 48 an extra judicial confession was made by the accused to his friend. The Court found that the statement was unambiguous and unmistakably conveyed that the accused C was the perpetrator of the crime. The Court also found that the testimony of the friend was truthful, reliable and trustworthy. It was therefore held by this Court that the conviction of the accused on such extra judicial confession was proper and no corroboration was necessary. It was also held that much importance should not be given to minor discrepancies and technical errors.
12. In the present case apart from the statement of recovery there is a clinching circumstance against the appellant. That is, the head of the deceased wife was recovered from another well situated in the land of another person and the said recovery was made at the instance of the appellant. The said fact of the head being in another well was within the exclusive knowledge of the appellant and if he had not committed the murder he could not have shown E the well in which the head was found. The High Court was therefore perfectly justified in relying upon the statement of confession and the recovery of the head at the instance of the appellant for holding that the appellant was guilty of murder.
13. The High Court is also right in placing reliance on muddamal article 20, a letter written by the appellant to his friend who was the second accused which indicated that there was some evil plan between the two.
14. Learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that the High Court is not justified in upsetting the order of acquittal passed by the G trial court when the same was based on several reasons set out therein. 1t is also argued that none of the reasons given by the trial court has been independently considered by the High Court. According to learned counsel each and every reason found in the judgment of the trial court must be dealt with by the High Court before it reverses the conclusion of the trial court. It is also argued that the medical evidence as well as the other circumstantial H evidence are contrary to the contents of the statement of confession made "'– ' 1 -""( ' .. ., · V.S. POLv. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA [SRINIVASAN,J.] by the appellant and in the face of such contradictions the Court ought not A to have relied on the extra judicial confession. It is further contended that the High Court has infact accepted one part of the statement of confession finding it to be true. According to the learned counsel such a course is not open to the High Court.
15. We have carefully gone through the judgment of both the Courts B below and also the evidence on record. The trial court has given various reasons for not accepting the extra-judicial confession but all are on the premise that the other evidence on record is contrary thereto. The High Court has relied upon the crux of the statement of confession and proceeded on the footing that the other details mentioned in the statement are not of much C relevance and even if there is a variation between such details and the other evidence on record, it would be of no consequence. We are in agreement with the view taken by the High Court ..
16. The main contention of the appellant is that in the post mortem examination the opinion expressed by the doctor is that the death occurred D due to haemorrhage by cutting off the head and that there is no evidence of the strangling of the deceased by the appellant. There is no merit in this contention. Even if there had been any mark of strangling, the same would not be visible as the neck was cut. The body was found in such highly de- composed condition, it would not have been possible at all for the doctor, who conducted the post mortem, to have found anything relating to the strangling of the deceased by the appellant. Further, one important factor should be kept in mind when we consider the evidence afforded by the post mortem report. When the post mortem was carried out, the appellant had not made the confession. On seeing the headless trunk, normally and naturally, the doctor would have proceeded to conduct the post mortem on the footing that the death occurred on account of the chopping of the head. In such a situation, the doctor expressed an opinion that death was due to haemorrhage but it is seen that in the post mortem report there is no reference to the symptoms which indicated such haemorrhage. The same reasoning would apply to the opinion of the doctor that the injuries found on the body were ante mortem.
17. Our attention has been drawn to some of the passages in the Modi's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology; edited by C.A. Franklin, Twenty-first Edition and also Parikh's Text Book of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology edited by Dr. C.K. Parikh. None of the passages is of any help H A in the present case in view of the facts mentioned above and in particular the circumstance that the body was highly de-composed when it was discovered. Reference has also been made to the following passage in the Text Book on Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology by John Glaister: c "Ante-mortem and post-mortem bruises. The signs which are indicative of ante-mortem production of bruises are swelling of the tissues, discoloration of the skin, extravasation of blood into the true skin and subcutaneous tissues, with infiltration. When bruise is well developed, an exm;niner is justified in assuming the view that it was produced during life. Nevertheless for medico-legal purposes, a microscopical examination should be made to verify the presence of infiltrated blood. Since infiltration is possible only while the heart is beating, this sign is conclusive that the injury was produced during life. While molecular life remains in the tissues, considerable violence applied to a dead body with a blunt instrument will produce a slight degree of extravasation, but never to the same extent as during life and infiltration of the tissues will be absent. Suspected areas of bruising should always be incised to 'differentiate them from colour marks due to hypostasis, since both conditions may coexist in the same region of the body. In bruising, extravasated blood is present, but in hypostasis the severed small vessels are filled with blood and extravasation is absent."
18. There is nothing on record to show that the post mortem examination was of the type mentioned in the above passage. In such circumstances we p are unable to place any reliance on the opinion of the doctor who conducted the post mortem. ,.._
19. In Manquli Dei v. State of Orissa, AIR (1989) Supreme Court 483 the wife killed her husband and buried the dead body in the house. According to her confessional statement she gave four axe blows on the head of the G deceased. The dead body was recovered according to her statement but the injuries on the dead body were not visible as it was highly de-composed. The Court held that the confession could not be rejected merely on the ground that only one simple injury was stated in the post mortem report. The facts in the present case are similar and the same principle will apply.
20. There is no substance in the contention that the steel box discovered -·"' V.S. POLv. ST ATE OF MAHARASHTRA [SRINIVASAN,J.] on the statement of the second accused would not be sufficient to place the A dead body inside and carry it. Comments are also made that the discovery of the steel box and kukhari belies the statement of the appellant that he had discarded the same before returning to his place of duty. A card-board model of the steel trunk was produced before us. In our view that size of the trunk is quite sufficient to place the body of the deceased inside by folding it which B could be possible immediately after the death. In any event the variation between the minor details contained in the statement of confession and the circumstances brought out in the evidence will not in any way affect the. acceptability of the confession of the appellant that he killed his wife.
21. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the decisions in C Nishi Kant Jha v. The State of Bihar, [1969) 1 S.C.C. 347; Harchand Singh & Another v. State of Hmyana, [1974) 3 S.C.C. 397; Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, [ 1988) Supp. S.C.C. 526 and Chhittar v. State of Rajas than, [1995) Supp. 4 S.C.C. 519. None of the rulings is of any help to the appellant as the facts therein are entirely different. The principles on which extra-judicial confession could form the basis of a conviction are well settled. We have D already referred to the judgment in State of UP. v. MK Anihony, (Supra) and Manquli Dei v. State of Orissa, (supra). We may usefully add the decision in Piara Singh and others, v. State of Punjab, AIR (1977) S.C. 2274. Jn that case it was held that law does not require that the evidence of an extra judicial confession should in all cases be corroborated and where such confession E was proved by an independent witness who was a responsible officer and who bore no animus against the accused, there was hardly any justification to dis-believe the same.
22. In the result we have no hesitation to uphold the judgment of the High Court in so far as it finds the appellant to be guilty of committing the p murder of his wife. The conviction is therefore upheld.
23. However, we are not satisfied that this is a rarest of rare cases in order to warrant award of death sentence to the appellant. The ends of justice would be met by reducing the sentence to one of imprisonment for life. The appeal is allowed to that extent and the sentence awarded to the appellant G is altered into one of imprisonment for life. S.V.K.I. Appeal allowed.