Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
3. In support of the appeal, primary stand of learned counsel for the appellant was that even though the conviction is maintainable on the basis of evidence of solitary witness that witness's version must be free from any blemish. In the instant c case, the evidence of PW-1 does not inspire confidence. Primarily it was submitted that when there is a solitary witness's evidence it would be unsafe to rest the conviction thereon.
4. Learned counsel for the State on the other hand supported the judgments of the trial Court and the High Court. .A
5. The law relating to the approach of the courts when prosecution version essentially rests on the testimony of a single witness has been highlighted by this Court in many cases.
6. On a consideration of tt:e relevant authorities and the provisions of the l'ndian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act') the following propositions may be safely stated as firmly established: (1) As a general rule, a court can and may act on .._, . the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character. (2) Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases G where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon, for example in the case' of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character. ; [2008) 16 S.C.R. (3) Whether. corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in a matter like this and much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes. c
7. Ther~fore, there is no hesitation in holding that the contention that in a murder case the court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too broadly stated.
8. In Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614) this Court had gone into this controversy and divided the nature of witnesses in three categories, namely, wholly relia.ble, wholly unreliable and lastly, neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the case of the first two categories this Court said that they pose little difficulty but iri'the case. of the third category. of witnesses, corroboration would be required. The relevant portion is quoted as under: '11. : .. Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well- established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for praying or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into thre~ categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly '-'nreliable_. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. · 12. In the first category -of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way – it may · convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, ·if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, ·incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally -has no difficulty in -f .. ….;., ll VITHAL PUNDALIK ZENDGE v. STATE OF –y-+ MAHARASHTRA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to ;i insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses.'
9. Vadivelu Thevar case (supra) was referred to with approval in Jagdish Prasad v. State of M.P (AIR 1994 SC c 1251 ). This Court held that as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting· a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'the Evidence Act'). But, if there are doubts about the testimony the courts will insist on corroboration. It is for the court to act upon the testimony of witnesses. It is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. On this principle stands the edifice of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise."
10. The position has been re-iterated in large number of cases. Reference may be made to Joseph v. State of Kera/a (2003 (1) SCC 465), Yakub lsmai/bhai Patel v. State of F Gujarat (2004 (12) SCC 229), Bhimapa Chandappa Hosamani and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2006 ( 11) SCC , 323) and Kunju @ Balachandran v. State of Tamil Nadu. [2008(2)SCC 151].
11. Coming to the evidence of PW-1, the roles played by accused persons have been elaborately described in detail. She has described the role played by each of the accused persons. She has stated that she was at a distance of about 12 ft from the place of occurrence. Interestingly, a suggestion in cross examination was given that distance was about 20 ft. In other words, her presence has been accepted. Since the accused persons were known to her, a minute difference in the distance is really of no consequence.
12. She has deposed that she knew all the accused as they were the residents of the same locality ~here she lived since her birth. On 15th December, 1995 at about 11.30 p.m. when she went to attend the nature's call near the public toilet, she saw accused No.4 with her brother, the deceased. The C accused No.4 had kept his hand on her brothers' shoulder· and they were going towards ttie toilet. They were talking loudly and accused No.4 was abusing her brother. Then . he started assaulting her brother with a long weapon like gupti. All the other accused were standing near the garbage bin. She was D near the toilet. When accused No.4 was assaulting her brother, all the other accused who were standing close by came near her brother. They all also caught him and assaulted him with weapons in their hands. Accused Nos. 7 and 8 caught his hands, accused No.6 caught him by the hand, accused Nos.1,· E 2, 3 and 5 started assaulting him with weapons in their hands which were like gupti. This is in essence prosecution case.
13. She has further deposed that she was at a distance of about 12 ft. from the place ofthe incident. She stood there F and watched the incident. At that time the street lights were on and there were 2 lights on the spot. She as well as her brother shouted "Bachao Bachao". Nobody came for help. Her brother fell down and the assailants ran away. A taxi came and accused Nos. 1 to 4 fled in that taxi. She rushed to R.A.K. Marg Police Station which was at a 5 minutes walking distance to meet the G officer in 'charge. Her mother also came to the police station. The police officer went to KEM Hospital. She returned to the spot and found that her brother was not .there. She learnt that he w~s removed to KEM hospital and she also went to the hospital. Her brother had died. The police recorded her VITHAL PUNDALIK ZENDGE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA statement in the hospital. That was treated as the FIR, marked Exhibit-16.
14. In spite of incisive cross examination a few contradictions of very minor nature have been elicited. They are not sufficient to throw out her evidence. Such discrepancies have been rightly held by the trial Court and the High Court to be of no consequence as she has been a witness of ghastly crime when in front of her, her brother was brutally murdered.
15. Above being the position we find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. R.P. Appeal dismissed.