Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
31. We therefore, called upon the appellants to address · us on the above questions. b
32. We made it clear to the appellants that this Court will consider the defence, if any, of each of the appellants to the proposed termination oftheir licences on a new ground now set up by the respondent Board and invited them to make their submissions in that regard. Such suggestion was made in view of the possibility that if the appellants did not have any substantive defence against the prqposed termination of the licences, interference with the order under appeal on the ground that there is a procedural lapse would only have the effect of protracting the litigation thereby enabling the appellants to continue occupation of public property and deprive the Board of higher revenue.
33. A preliminary objection is raised by the appellants for examination of the above-mentioned questions. The appellants argued that neither of the two grounds, now relied upon by the respondent Board, are the grounds on which either the High Court directed the eviction of the appellants nor the quit notices . A i~ued by the respondent Board are founded." Therefore, this Court may not embark upon an examination of those questions as a Court of 1st instance. According to the appellants, such an examination would take the appellants by surprise. Without prejudice to the preliminary objection, the learned counsel for i3 the appellants also argued that they have a right of renewal of the licences and/or to continue in possession of the land in dispute.
34. In response to the preliminary objection, it is argued. on behalf of the Board that this Court in exercise of its C jurisdiction under Article 142 can undertake· such an examination in an appropriate case to render complete justice in these batch of matters. Shri Nariman relied upon Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor & General Traders {(1975) 1 SCC 770]11• and Rameshwar and Others Vs. Jot Ram and D Another etc. {(1976) 1 SCC 194]12b, in support of this submission. 11 a. Rameshwar and Others 'O's. Jot Ram and Another etc. ((1976) 1 SCC 194] – para (7) The realism of our processual justice bends our jurisprudence to mould, negate or regulate reliefs in the light of exceptional developments having a material and equitable import, occurring during the · pendency of the litigation so that the Court may not stultify itself by granting what has become meaningless or does not, by a myopic view, miss decisive alterations in fact-situations or legal positions and drive parties to fresh litigation whereas relief can be given right here. The broad principle, so stated, strikes a,, chord of sympathy in a court of good cpnscience. But a seeming virtue may prove a treacherous vice unless judicial perspicacity, founded on well-grounded rules, studies the plan of the statute, its provisions regarding subsequent changes and the possible damage to the social programme of the measure if later events are allowed to unsettle speedy accomplishment of a restructuring of the land system which is the soul ol the whole enactment. No processual equity can be permitted to sabotage a cherished reform, nor individual hardship thwart social justice. This wider perspective explains the rulings cited on both sides and the law of subsequent events on pending actions. 1b Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor & General Traders (1975) 1 SCC 770 – para (4) – We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about ihe jurisdiction and propriety vis-a-vis circumstances which come into being . subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as 'on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 829 COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.) –
35. We reject the preliminary objection for the following reason:- lhe jurisdiction under Article 136 is discretionary. It is settled by catena of decisions of this Court that the jurisdiction under Article 136 is purely discretionary only to be exercised in order to ensure that injustice is not perpetuated. One of the important attributes of discretionary jurisdiction is that such jurisdiction is not exercised where it is likely to be a futile exercise i.e. where the relief might be of no use to the applicant because it would still be open to the competent authority to achieve the result sought to be achieved by the disputed action leaving the defeat i.e. by following the proper procedure etc. 12• Though the statement of the principle in the references in the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind c to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or !airplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justic" – subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts tq confine it to the triaL Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and .developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed .. 12a In some cases the courts have refused applications for mandamus to restore to office.persons who have been irregularly removed, on the ground that the remedy might be of no use to the applicant, because it would still be open to the competent authority to remove him by the proper procedure. There are also decisions in licensing cases to like effect (de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Fourth Edition Pg. 561.) 12b. Seervai H.M., Constitutional Law of India [Bombay: N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., 3rd Edn. Vol.2 (1984) para 16.279 page 1367]. (2013) 17 S.C.R. A footnote are made in the context of the jurisdiction of the Court to issue mandamus, the principle applies proprio vigore to the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. Such being the principle of law, even if the present batch of appeals are to be allowed, as prayed for, on the ground that B the orde.r under challenge is made in breach of th~ .rul~ of. atiq; alterarr)p,artem, nothing in law prevents the Board from calliljlg upon the appellants to desist from use of the land in d.ispute, Such a course of action is the declared intention of the Board. In such an event, once again the High Court and this Court c would have to examine the questions framed above.
36. Therefore, accepting the preliminary objection and refusing to consider the ground newly raised by the Board would ooly "drive the parties to fresh litigation" rendering the present adjudication a futile exercise of the jurisdiction of this D Court. The issue can be decided here and now to prevent a possible damage to the programme proposed to be undertaken by the Board and its "speedy accomplishment". The two decisions (See Footnote 11) relied upon by the E Board are a clear authority for the proposition that this Court in either granting or declining to grant a relief in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 can take note of developments either of fact or law which leave an impact on the rights and obligations of parties before the Court.
37. We shall first deal with the question of element of surprise as it is the duty of this Court to scrupulously ensure the "rules of fairness to both sides", in every case. Such duty is more rigorous in the instant case because of the fact that the respondent Board has come out with a new ground for G denying the relief to the appellants – the legality of which we will have to consider as the court of first instance.
38. The Board seeks to debar the appellants from using the land in dispute. Such a decision of the Board rested on the YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 831 COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.] ord~r of the Hi9h Court under ch,allenge. But during the pendency of the present proceedings the Board altered !fie · basis of its decision and decided to res~ on the need of (i) the . land in the dispu_te (covered t>y the manually operated plots) for providing better facilities and (ii) mechariically operated plots for securing better/higher revenue. Tl;\e legality of such proposed action of the Board would depend on (a) the true character of the legal relationship between the appellants and the. Board; (b) whether such relationship confers a right on the appellants to continue use of the disputed property either for eternity or for a definite period; (c) the legal authority of the c Board to terminate such relationship; and (d)' the procedure required to be followed for such termination.
39. To answer the above question we examine the nature of the legal rights flowing from such allotments~ The plots in dispute are property vested in a public body (statutory corporation) performing important public functions. In the matter of creating rights and/or conferring privileges such a body is ·required .to act in public interest under some rational policy. We have already notice.d that the Board is bound by the policy directions given by the Government of India under Section 111 of the Act, and that the Government of India from time to time issued policy guidelines. In the policy guidelines issued in 2004, the following were the directives: "(b) No sale or lease should be permitted. Land should be given on licence basis only. The licence may be up to a maximum period of 11 months and shall normally be in accordance with the Schedule of Rates (SoR)/rates approved by the competent authority. At the discretion of the Chairman, such licence may also be given by inviting tenders. The licence can be renewed at the expiry of the previous licence period. Each renewal of licence shall be treated as fresh licence."
40. When it came to 2010, it is specifically laid down that A the "licence can be renewed by the Chairman twice" 13 subject to either the prior approval or subsequent ratification of the board.
41. It can be seen from the policy guidelines that while the B 2004 policy forbids sale or lease of land, the 2010 policy makes it the normal rule subject to exceptions. The 2004 Land Policy guidelines enable the Board only to grant or renew a licence without any limitation on the number of renewals. The 2010 policy guidelines clearly restrict the authority of the Board to renew the licences for only two terms. The tenure of any licence C is stipulated to be for a maximum period of 11 months. In either case, from the language of the policy guidelines it is clear that · the policy onl~ enables the Board 'to renew the licences granted but does not create any vested right in favour of the licensor. Even the letter of allotment makes it clear that what is granted D is only a licence. (See Footnote 6) Therefore, we are of the opinion that the allotment of plots in dispute is only by way of a licence, as defined under Section 52 of the Easements Act, 188214 •
42. As rightly pointed out by Shri Nariman, licence by definition does not create any interest in the property15. A 13. Normally, land inside custom bound area shall be given on licence basis only. The licence may be granted by the Chairman. It may be granted up to a maximum period of 11 months and shall normally be in accordance with the Scale of Rates (SoR)/ rates approved by the competent authority. Any concession shall be given only with the approval of the Board. At the discretion of the Chairman, such licence may also be given by inviting tenders. The licence can· be r.enewed by the Chairman twice. Further renewal shall be with the approval of the Board or by the Chairman, subject to ratification by the Boards. Each renewal of licence shall be treated as a fresh licence. G 14. "52. "Licence" defined – Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or uporr #le immoveable property of the granter, something which would, in the absence of.such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a licence." 15. Associated Hotels of India Ltd., Vs. R.N. Kapoor [AIR 1959 SC 1262] – (27) [There is a marked distinction between a lease and a licence. S. 105 of YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 833 COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.] licence only gives a right to use the immovable property of the granter, to the grantee. There is no transfer of any interest in such property in favour of the grantee. On the other hand, under the Transfer of Property Act, an interest either limited or uh limited is created in favour of the transferee depending upon the nature of the transfer (sale, mortgage or lease etc.). Under Section 6016 , a licence is revocable at the will of the granter which is the essence of a licence17. The Easements Act the Transfer of Property Act defines a lease out of immoveable property as a transfer of a right to enjoy such property made for a certain time in consideration for a price paid or promised. Under S. 108 of the said Act, the lessee is entitled to be put in possession of the property. A lease is therefore a transfer of an interest in land. The interest transferred is called the leasehold interest. The lessor parts with his right to enjoy the property during the term ofthe lease, and it follows from it that the lessee gets that right to the exclusion of the lessor. Whereas S. 52 of the Indian Easements Act defines a licence thus: . "Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do or continue to do, in or upon the immoveable property of the granter, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a licence." Under the aforesaid section,] if a document gives only a right to use the property in a particular way or under certain terms while it remains in possession and control of the owner thereof, it will be a licence. The legal possession, therefore, continues to be with the owner of the property, but the licencee is permitted to make use of the premises for a particular purpose. But for the permission his occupation would be unlawful. It does not create in his favour any estate or interest in the property. There is, therefore, clear distinction between the two concepts. The dividing line is clear though sometimes it becomes very thin or even blurred …….. . 16. ''60. Licence when revocable – A licence may be revoked by the' grantor, unless – (a) it is coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in force; (b) the licencee, acting upon the lilcense, has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution." 17. Mrs. M.N. Clubwala and another vs. Fida Hussain Saheb and others [AIR 1965 SC 610] – (12) While it is true that the essence of a licence is that it is revocable at the will of the grantor the provision in the licence that the licencee would be entitled to a notice before being ·required to vacate is (2013] 17 S.C.R. A categorically declares that a licence can be revoked by the granter except in the two contingencies specified under Section 60(a) & (b). No such exceptions are pleaded or demonstrated by the appellants. Therefore, it must be held that none of the appellants have any indefeasible right of renewal either under B the Easements Act or under the above mentioned policy . . 43. However, that does not mean that a public body like the respondent Board can arbitrarily decline to renew a licence. It is well settled by a .catena of decisions of this Court that no C public body under our Constitutional system is vested with such arbitrary powers, as Was pointed out by this Court in R.D. Sheffy Vs. Airport Authorities, (1979) 3 SCC 48918• If the Board decides not to renew any licence either with respect to a class of licences or with reference to a specific area of the land, normally such a decision cannot be said to be· either irrational D or arbitrary unless there are other compelling reasons to indicate that the decision has no rational purposl:!'·to be achieved. 44. In the counter filed by the respondent Board (in this E batch of appeals), it is stated that the entire parcel of land which not inconsistent with a licence. [In England it has been held that a contractual licence may be revocable or irrevocable according to the express or implied terms of the contract between the parties. It has further been held that if the licencee under a revocable licence has brought property on to the land, he is entitled to notice of revocation and to a reasonable time for removing his property, and in which to mare arrangements to carry on his business elsewhere. (see Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edn. Vol. 23, p. 431). Thus the mere necessity of giving a notice to a licencee requiring him to vacate the licenced premises would not indicate that the transaction was a lease ……. " 18. Para 10 – " …… It is indeed unthinkable that in a democracy governed by the rule of law the executive Government or any of its officers should possess arbitrary power over t~e interests of the individual. Every action of the executive Government must be informed with reason and should' be free from arbitrariness. That is the very essense of ttfe rule of law and its bare minimal requirement. And to the application of this principle it makes no difference whether the exercise of the power involves affectation of some right or denial of some priv;lege." YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 835 COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.) was allotted to the various appellants who are licencees of the manually operated plots (and others, who are not before us), from time to time by the Board in favour of iron ore exporters, (except a small portioo of the land allotted in favour of the Odisha Mining Development Corporation), .is proposed to be utilised by the Board after terminating the licences of the appellants herein for creating certain modern operational facifities in connection with the activities of the Port. Such a decision cannot be said to be arbitrary or an irrational exercise of authority of a public body, having regard to the object sought to be a«hieved by the Board of creating modern amenities. The c excE:f>liorf in· ·favour of the Odisha Mining Development Corp6ration. c~r\hot, In our opinion, amo1,mt to discriminatory trei3trfient of \tie appellants, sfr\ce that Corporation is admittedly a State owned Corporation and forms a class by itself. Therefore, the proposed course of action by the Board lo terminate neither infringes any legal right of tho/<lppellants nor amounts to an arbitrary exercise of the autt1ority by the Boa.rd. 45. We also place on record that the appellants submitted that the concession agreements on BOT basis dated 01.07 .2009 ended in litigation and therefore the proposed project of the Board is not likely to materialise. In response it is submitted by the Board that even if the parties with whom the BOT arrangement was entered into eventually default in their obligation, the Board would explore alternatives to proceed with the project but will not abandon the same. 46. We are left with the question whether this Court would be justified in the above mentioned circumstances in declining lo interfere with the order under appeal and deny relief to the appellants .. · 47, The Board desi.res to utilise the parcel of land in dispute (in this batch of cases) for a purpose which is authorised by law and serves better the larger interests of nation 19. Footnote No.10. A – including the interests of the exporters and importers such as the appellants. Setting aside the order under appeal on the ground of breach of natural justice would be a futile exercise as explained earlier. The respondent Board/licensor can always terminate/revoke the licences. In view of our conclusion B that the proposed revocation of licences would not amount to an irrational or arbitrary decision, rejecting the new plea of the Board or any ground would only lead to protracted litigation consuming considerable time and delay in execution of the project, by the Board. Such a delay would not subserve public c interest. This Court shall not contribute to such delay on the ground of some perceived procedural irregularity, particularly when the appellants have no substantive right. The appellants were given a wholesome opportunity by this Court to establish their legal right, to prevent the Board from terminating their. licences. 48. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.38013 of 2012 is filed by Auroglobal Comtrade Pvt. Ltd, which was the petitioner in W.P. (C) No.11785/2012 in the High Court of Orissa. The appellant was allotted a plot by the Board pursuant E to a process of tender in which the appellant became the successful bidder quoting an amount· of Rs.3,06,29,759/-. A licence for the use of the plot for 11 months was granted by the respondent Board under a letter dated 1st August, 2011, after collecting the abovementioned amount. The appellant F made two representations in the months of April and June 2012 to the Board seeking a reriewal of the licence. The. Board again called upon the appellant to deposit Rs.3,06,29, 759/- for renewing the licence. Challenging the demand, the appellant approached the High Court seeking reliefs already noted earlier · G in the judgment (see i:iara 14). 49. The writ petition was filed essentially on the ground that one of the tender conditions contained in para 5 of the tender notice dated 2.6.2011 is violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India, therefore void ab initio. Consequently, YAZDANI ~TERNATIONAL P. l:TD~ v. AUROGLOBAL 837 COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.] demand of the bid amount afresh for renewal of the licence is also illegal. Though it is not clearly spelt out in the writ petition, the legal basis of attack on para 5 aUhe tender. notice is that while the licencees, who secured allotmentS;-prior to 2005, continued to P.ay a fixed licence fee of Rs.9/- per sq. ft per month under the ',scale of Rates' fixed by the Tar,iff Authority created under Section. 4 7 A of. the Act, the appellant is compelled to pay substantially higher amount, apart from the amount fixed by the Tariff Authority. The size and use of the plot allotted to the appellant is similar to that of the allottees prior to 2005. c 50. The above submission of the appellant is sought to be repelled by the Board on the princip[e that the appellant secured the licence- pursuant to tender notice with eyes wide open and in full knowledge of the terms and conditions under which licences are offered. The petitioner enjoyed the benefit of the ·licence for a year (and still continues in occupation of the property pursuant-to tt!E)" interim orders of this Court, for about a year); and now the appellant cannot tum back and challenge the conditions subject to which the licence was granted to it In · support of the said submission, the Board relied upon the following judgments. Hari Shankar & Ors. Vs. Dy. Excise & Taxation Commissioner & Ors,, (1975) 1 SCC 737, Shyam Lal & Ors. Vs. ·state of Punjab, (1977) 1 SCt 336' and State Bank of Haryana & Ors. Vs. JafJe Ram & Ors., (1980) 3 SCC 599. i= 51. We reject the submission of the appellant for two reasons. Firstly, the appellant acquired the licence knowing fully well. the terms and conditions subject to which the licence is offered by the Board. So they cannot lake the benefit of the offer and ren~unce the .~orresponding obligation (approbate and reprobate). ·Secondly', the claim of the appellant that they are being discriminated against is required to be rejected since those licencees who are paying a lower 'licence fee' had sec;ured th,)Se licenses .at a point of time when there was no A competition. The market conditions were different. Things or events seemingly similar and at par need not always be so. There can be facets which distinguish. The present situation is one of them .. 52. One of the grounds pleaded in the appeal and argued before us by Shri C.A. Sundaram, learned ~P.nior counsel appearing for the appellant that – ·· ………. tpere is distinction between lease and license and both are dealt with separately. License comes under Section 49(1)(d) i.e. any other use. Section 49(3) of the Major Port Trust Act says that the board may lease any land at a rate higher than that provided under Section 49(1 ). Thus. only in respect of lease the port trust can change a rate higher than the scale of rates· approved by TAMP. Clause 6.1.1(a) of the Land Policy 2010 clearly states that license can be granted by inviting tender but renewal will have to be under the scale of rates approved by TAMP." e: It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that: Section 49(1) authorises the collection of licence fees in accordance with the scale of rates framed by the Tariff Authority for the various uses (of the property of the Board) specified under Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 49 sub-section(1 ). Section 49, sub-section (3) authorises the Board to allot plots either by F following the procedure of auction or inviting tenders and demand amounts higher than those contemplated under sub- section (1 ). The learned counsel argued that having regard to the language of sub-section (3). once the Board resorts to the process of auction or inviting tenders. the Board can only allot G a plot on lease but not a licence. 53. Though, the Port Trust sought to repel the submission on various grounds, we do not propose to examine those defences in extenso. YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 839 Ce>MTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.) 54. We reject the submission since we do not see any warrant for placing such restriction on the authority of the Board, from the language of Section 49 sub-section (3). The opening clause of sub-section (3)~ "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1 ). the Board may, by auction or by inviting tenders, lease ….. ." authorises the Board to lease its properties either by auction or by inviting tenders. There is no warrant to_read into the language of said sub-section a legislative intention that in every case where the Board undertakes the process of auction c Or inviting tenders, it is bound/obliged to grant a lease of .its ·properties. The expression 'the Board may' occurring in the said sub-section, to our mind indicates that the lease is the highest of rights that may be created on the properties, by the Board under the said provision. It does not eliminate the discretion of the Board to permit use of its properties by any arrangement which trc1nsfers a lesser or no interest (such as a licence) in the property . . 55. On the above analysis, we see no merits in the claim of the appellant. For the same reason as given for dismissing the appeals, the appeal of the Auroglobal is also dismissed, as the plot allotted to this appellant is also required for the developmental project proposed to be undertaken by the respondent Board. 56. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.28841/2012 is filed by Odisha Mining Corporation Ltd., one of the licensees of the respondent Board. This matter can be disposed of in view of a specific statement made at the bar on behalf of the Board that the Board does not propose to terminate the licence of the appellant as the plot of land allotted to the appellant is not required for the purpose of its proposed developmental project. Accordingly, this appeal stands disposed of. 57. Coming to the 7 mechanically operated iron ore plots, they were allotted on different dates the details of which are as follows: s. Plot Holder Initial Renewals No. & SLP No. Allotment 1. Bagadiya Brothers 01.08.2011 Last renewal upto 28.02.2013 SLP No. 28842/2012 (Manual Iron Ore c plot holder) 2. Rungta Mines Ltd. 04.06.2011 and Last 25.07.2005 renewed on 01.04.2012 upto SLP No.27512/2012 28.02.2013 3. M/s Core Minerals 2001 and 2004 Last renewal granted in July 2012 SLP No.27511/2012 upto 30.09.2012 4. Essel Mining Allotment Last renewal and Industries by various upto Ltd. allotment 30.09.2012 orders from June 2001 to SLP No.27516/2012 July 2005 5. JSW lspat Steel Ltd. 13.02.2012 Last renewed upto SLP No. 26922/2012 30.09.2012 YAZDANI INTERNATIONAL P. LTD. v. AUROGLOBAL 841 COMTRADE P. LTD. [CHELAMESWAR, J.] 6. Orissa Mining 16.05.1996 Corporation Ltd. 04.04.1997, SLP No.28841/2012 20.08.1997 'J. Taurian Iron ?!< Last Steel Ltd. .- "- renewed upto SLP No.32005/2012 30.09.2012 Each one of them enjoyed the benefit. of the allotment of · plot by virtue of successive renewals. We have already taken note of the fact that under the 2004 policy guidelines the licences granted by the Port Trust could be renewed without any limitation on the number of renewals that could be granted. However, under the 2010 p_olicy, the number of renewals was restricted to two: From the material on record, it appears that each one of these appellants (mechanically operated plot licencees) enjoyed a number of renewals. We see no reason · tojnterfere with the decision of the Board to terminate the licences for the following reasons – firstty, a licence does not create any indefeasible le9al right. Secondly, we do not see any irrationality in the decision of the Board, even from the point of view of the fact that the Board is a public body (the State within the meaning of Article 12) and therefore, obliged to act rationally. The Board's decision to terminate the licences is consistent with the policy guidelines of 2010. Thirdly, in view of the assertion of the Board in its additional affidavit dated 25th November, 2013, " ……… the existing iron ore traffic which is showing a growth rate of 159.56% during current financial year (upto October 2013) in comparison to the iron ore traffic handled during the same period of the previous financial year, it is submitted that non-availability of mechanical plots to the Paradip Port Trust will entail huge financial loss to the port which is a major port under Government of India. This will also result in idling of the existing iron ore handling plant for which significant money has been spent and dedicated facilities have been created for efficient and effective handling of iron. ore [2013] 17 .s.C.R. A traffic. This will also result in diversion of iron ore traffic to nearby private Ports which is already happening due to non availability ofMechanical plots to Paradip Port Trust'', we do not see any reason to doubt the said assertion. 58. Interfering with the notices of termination of licences in each one of these cases on the ground that the notices were initially based on a decision of the Orissa High Court to which these appellants were not parties, would not be in the larger public interest. 59 .. We have already made it c;lear earlier in this judgment that we propose to deal with these petitions as if they were petitions under Article 32 and permitted the appellants to place all the material 'which would be available to them i.n law in defence even if the impugned termination orders were not to D be based on the decision of the High Court. 60. Except arguing that the decision of the Orissa High Court is in violation of principles of natural justice, the appellants failed to place before this Court any material to establish that the decision of the Board to terminate their licences is otherwise E violative of any of the substantive right. In the circumstances, we decline to interfere with the decision of the Board. All the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. Rajendra Prasad Appeals disposed.