YOGESH SINGH versus MAHABEER SINGH & ORS.

28. A survey of the judicial pronouncements of this Court onthis point leads to the inescapable conclusion that the evidence of a closely related witnesses is required to be carefully scrutinised and appreciated before any conclusion is made to rest upon it, regarding the convict/accused in a given case. Thus, the evidence cannot be disbelieved merely on the ground that the witnesses are related to each other or to the deceased. In case the evidence has a ring of truth to it, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, it can, and certainly should, be relied upon. (See Anil Rai Vs. State ofBihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318; State ofU.P. Vs. Jagdeo Singh; (2003) I SCC 456; Bhagalool Lodh & Anr. Vs. State ofU.P., (2011) 13 SCC 206; Dahari & Ors. Vs. State ofU. P., (2012) c c 10 SCC 256; Raju@Balachandran & Ors.Vs. StateofTamilNadu, (2012) 12 SCC 701; Gang11hhavani Vs. Rayapati Venkat Reddy & Ors., (2013) 15 SCC 298; Jodhan Vs. State of M.P., (2015) 11 SCC 52). Discrepancies in Evidence

29. It is well settled in law that the minor discrepancies are not to be given undue emphasis and the evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness. The test is whether the same inspires confidence in the mind of the Court. If the evidence is incredible and cannot be accepted by the test of prudence, then it may create a dent in the prosecution version. If an omission or discrepancy goes to the root of the matter and ushers in incongruities, the defence can take advantage of such inconsistencies. It needs no special e11Jphasis to state that every omission cannot take place of a material omission and, therefore, minor contradictions, inconsistencies or insignificant embellishments do not affect the core of the prosecution case and should not be taken to be a ground to reject the prosecution evidence. The omission should create a serious doubt about the truthfulness or creditworthiness of a witness. It is only the serious contradictions and omissions which materially affect the case of the prosecution but not every contradiction or omission. (See Rammi @ Rameshwar Vs. State of M.P., (1999) 8 SCC 649; Leela Ram (dead) through Duli Chand Vs. State ofHaryana and Another, (1999) 9 SCC 525; Bihari Nath Goswami Vs. Shiv Kumar Singh & Ors., (2004) 9 SCC 186; Vijay@ Chinee Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (20 I 0) 8 SCC 191; Sam path Kumar Vs. Inspector of Police, Krishnagiri, (2012) 4 SCC 124; Shyamal Ghosh Vs. State of West Bengal, (2012) 7 SCC 646 and Mritunjoy Biswas Vs. Pranab@ Kuti Biswas and Anr., (2013) 12 SCC-796). iapses in Investigation

30. In C. Muniappan and Others vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567, this Court explained the law on this point in the following manner: "There· may be highly defective investigation in a case. However, it is to be examined as to whether there is any lapse by the IO and whether due to such lapse any benefit should be given to the accused. The law on this issue is well settled that the defect in the investigation by itself cannot be a ground for acquittal. If primacy is given to such designed or negligent investigations or to the omissions or lapses by perfunctory investigation, the faith and confidence of the people in the criminal justice administration would be eroded. Where there has been negligence on the part of the investigating agency or omissions, etc. which resulted in defective investigation, there is a legal obligation on the part of the court to examine the prosecution evidence dehors such lapses, carefully, to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not and to what extent it is reliable and as to whether such lapses affected the object of finding out the truth. Therefore, the investigation is not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial. The conclusion of the trial in the case cannot be allowed to depend solely on the probity of investigation."

31. In the present case, the High Court found that the testimonies of the eye witnesses were not reliable. In this connection, the High Court noted that the very claim of the witnesses that on the fateful day, the deceased and his daughter PWS, Lajjawati were going to their house situated in the north of the village for any particular reason, did not carry any weight in view of the fact that the deceased used to reside in his self-contained shelter situated nearthe tube well which was far removed from the Village and where he used to retire each day before sunset. We are not inclined to endorse this finding of the High Court, particularly in light of the deposition of PWI and PWS, who stated under oath that on the fateful day, the deceased and PWS were going to another village via their village house.

32. The High Court also noted that there was no reason for the deceased to go through the fretas of the accused since there was a straight pathway for accessing the village from the tube-well. Moreover, the animosity between the informant and the accused persons was so deep that they had put restriction upon themselves not to trespass or pass through the fields of their opponents. We are not in agreement with this observation of the High Court as well in the light of the categorical finding by the trial court that along the north also there were fields of the very same accused, meaning thereby that in either case the deceased while going from his tube-well to his house in the village, would necessarily have to pass through the fields of the accused. It has also been submitted by the counsel on behalf of the appellant that this was precisely the 735. c . 736 c SUPREME COl,JRT REPORTS reason why the deceased used to retire to his separate citadel each day before sunset and carry his gun and cartridge-strip with him.

33. As far as the evidence of PW5 .is concerned, the High Court found that it was illogical that the dress of a child who was living with her parents in a different establishment would be kept in the custody of someone else who was living elsewhere, particularly in the light of the possessive attitude of children that urges them to cling to their most precious belongings. In this regard, it has been submitted by the counsel for the appellant that while the daily wears of PW5 were kept at the tube-well, fancy clothes for occasions were kept at the village house. Be that as it may, we are not inclined to agree with this reasoning of the High Court. Without attempting to indulge in any form of notional psychoanalysis of the child witness (PW5), we wish to emphasize that she was not subjected to any cross-examination on this point and hence any form of conjecture on this point would be wholly improper on our part. However, the learned counsel for the respondents have submitted that PWS was a tutored witness relying upon the fact that she had not taken a bath before leaving the house with her father to purportedly attend a marriage ceremony. We find that this contention is wholly · frivolous having no material bearing on the present case.

34. The learned counsel for the respondents has further sought to attack the testimony of this prosecution witness on the ground of delay in recording of her statement by the Investigating Officer. In support of this submission, learned counsel has relied upon the judgments of this Court in State of U.P. Vs. Ashok Dixit and Anr., (2000) 3 SCC 70; Vijaybhai Bhanabhai Patel Vs. Navnitbhai Patel & Ors., (2004) I 0 SCC 583; Jagjit Singh @Jagga Vs. State of Punjab, (2005) 3 SCC 689). However, we find that none of these cases help the case of the respondents since Vijaybhai Bhanabhai Patel Vs. Navnitbhai Patel & Ors., (2004) IO SCC 583, does not pertain to the case of a child witness and in State of U.P. Vs. Asbok Dixit and Anr., (2000) 3 SCC 70, and Jagjit Singh@Jagga Vs. State of Punjab, (2005)3 SCC 689, delay in recording of evidence was not per se held to be fatal to the prosecution case but the testimony of the child witness in each case was found to be incredible on account of material contradictions and lack of independent corroboration. We find that this is not the case here. In this context, we may note that the Trial Court has observed that PW5 was cross-examined on practically every detail of the prosecutirw ~tory and her statement corroborated every part thereof. Moreover, the delay in recording of the statement of PWS was not unexplained. It was rightly observed by the learned Trial Judge that the delay was on account of the fact that the Investigating Officer wanted to assure himself of the veracity of her statement and hence, she was examined after she had time to recover from the shock of the incident and compose herself. Under these circumstances, any delay in examining this witness under Section 161 ofCr.P.C. will not prejudice the prosecution.

35. Further, the High Court opined that when the bicycle was being kept regularly in the house of the deceased situated at the tube-well, it was very difficult to accept the explanation for the deceased to go to his village house. The High Court noted that this was reinforced by the fact that as per evidence of PWS, the brother-in-law of the deceased or the maternal uncle of PWS, namely, Ghanshyam was not in the village in the morning when the incident had occurred. However, we feel that there appears to be some confusion on this point. According to the versions of PWI and PW2, it was the brother-in-law ofRajvir (brother of the deceased), namely, Amar Singh who had visited the house of the deceased and had taken the bicycle of the deceased on the night prior to the date of the incident and that he was also present on the spot at the time of the incident. Now, it is true that PWS had stated in her deposition that "Mama" (maternal uncle) had taken the bicycle, it is quite probable that she meant to refer to Amar Singh and not Ghanshyam (her real maternal uncle being the brother of her mother). Hence, there is no conflict in the evidence of the eyewitnesses on this point.

36. A related contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that 'the story of marriage was introduced for the fil"$t time by the prosecution witnesses during trial and the same was not even !\roved. However, we must note the observations of the learned Trial Judge which were to the effect that the statements of the prosecution witnesses, under Section 162 Cr.P.C. were conspicuously silent on this part, thereby implying that the Investigating Officer did not care to inquire about it during investigation. Tl\us, in the light of the position of law examined above vis-a-vis effect oflapses in the investigation, we are not prepared to dispense with 'the accusation merely on this point especially when the Trial Court concluded that there was no material contradiction in the statements of PWl and PWS. c c

37. Another reason for which the High Court disbelieved the prosecution story is the improvement made by PW2 in the story of beheading of the deceased. We find it difficult to agree with this conclusion of the High Court in the light of the judgment of this Court in Leela Ram Vs. State ofHaryana, (1999) 9 SCC 525, wherein it was observed: "It is indeed necessary to note that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain some exaggeration or embellishment – sometimes there could even be a deliberate attempt to offer embellishment and sometimes in their over anxiety they may give a slightly exaggerated account. The court can sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Total repulsion of the evidence is unnecessary. The evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness. If this element is satisfied, it ought to inspire confidence in the mind of the court to accept the stated evidence though not however in the absence of the same."

38. Similarly, in Subal Ghorai and Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 607, this Court stated as follows: "Experience shows that witnesses do exaggerate and this Court has taken note of such exaggeration made by the witnesses and held that on account of embellishments, evidence of witnesses need not be discarded if it is corroborated on material aspects by the other evidence on record."

39. It was further noted by the High Court that the special report of the incident, that is, copy of the FIR had been received by the Magistrate l Yz months after the incident. Moreover, there was no time mentioned by PW8 in the relevant column as to when the inquest proceedings were started nor was any date or time mentioned in the relevant column as to when the inquest proceeding ended allegedly at the instruction of PW9, thus leading to an inference of antedating and fabrication. We find that these observations of the High Court are not supported by the evidence on record inasmuch as the DWI was himself not sanguine as to the correct date of receipt of the FIR in the present case. He simply stated that due to workload, the entry was made on 10.08.1982. Further, PW8 had stated in his deposition that PW9 must have spoken about the date and time of starting the Panchnama to be recorded in the relevant column but he could not be certain in view of loud noise at the place of the incident at the relevant time. In any event, in the light of the position of law examined above and the observation of the Trial Court that these merely show remissness on part of the investigating officer and should nofbe treated as fatal to the prosecution case, we are not inclined to disbelieve the prosecution story.

40. It has been consistently held by this Court through a catena of judicial decisions that although in terms of Section 157 Cr.P.C., the police officer concerned is required to forward a copy of the FIR to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence, promptly and without undue delay, it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever there is some delay in sending the FIR to the Magistrate, the prosecution version becom~s unreliable and the trial stands vitiated. When there is positive evidence to the fact that the FIR was recorded without unreasonable delay and investigation started on the basis of that FIR and there is no other infirmity brought to the notice of the Court, then in the absence of any prejudice to the accused, it cannot be concluded that the investigation was tainted and the prosecution story rendered unsupportable. [See Pala Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1972) 2 SCC 640; Sarwan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 369; Anil Rai Vs. State ofBihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318; Munshi Prasad & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar, (2002) I SCC 3 5 I; Aqeel Ahmad Vs. State ofU.P., (2008) 16 SCC 372; Dharamveer Vs. State ofU.P., (2010) 4 SCC 469; Sandeep Vs. State ofU.P., (2012) 6 SCC 107].

41. Further, the evidentiary value of the inquest report prepared under Section 174 ofCr.P.C. has also been long settled through a series of judicial pronouncements of this Court. It is well-established that inquest report is not a substantive piece of evidence and cah only be looked into for testing the veracity of the witnesses of inquest. The object of preparing such report is merely to ascertain the apparent cause of death, namely, whether it is suicidal, homicidal, accidental or caused by animals or 11'achinery etc. and stating in what manner, or by what weapon or instrument, the injuries on the body appear to have been inflicted. [See Pedda Narayan Vs. State of A.P., (1975) 4 SCC 153; Khujji Vs. State ofM.P., (1991) 3 SCC 627; Kuldip Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 1992 Supp (3) SCC I; George and Ors. Vs. State of Kerala and c c Anr., (2008) 4 SCC 605; Suresh Rai Vs. State ofBihar, (2000) 4 SCC 84; Amar Singh Vs. Balwinder Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 518; Radha Mohan Singh Vs. State ofU.P., (2006) 2 SCC 450; Sambhu Das Vs. State of Assam, (2010) IO SCC 3741.

42. In the present case, it is not the case of the accused that they have been prejudiced by the alleged delay in dispatch of the FIR to the nearest Magistrate competent to take cognizance of such offence. Moreover, in our opinion, the non-recording of certain relevant entries in the inquest report do not constitute a material defect so grave to throw out the prosecution story and the otherwise reliable testimonies of prosecution witnesses that have mostly remained uncontroverted.

43. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents has then tried to create a dent in the prosecution story by pointing out inconsistencies between the ocular evidence and the medical evidence. However, we are not persuaded with this submission since both the Courts below have categorically ruled that the medical evide1we was consistent with the ocular evidence and we can safely say that to that extent, it corroborated the direct evidence proffered by the eye-witne$ses. We hold that there is no material discrepancy in the medical and ocular evidence and there is no reason to interfere with the judgments of the Courts below on this ground. In any event, it has been consistently held by this Court that the evidentiary value of medical evidence is only corroborative and not conclusive and, hence, in case of a conflict between oral evidence and medical evidence, the former is to be preferred unless the medical evidence completely rules out the oral evidence. [See Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai Vs. StateofGujarat, (1983)2 SCC 174; Mani Ram Vs. State ofRa,jasthan, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 18; State ofU.P. Vs. Krishna Gopal & Anr., State ofHaryana Vs. Bhagirath, (1999) S SCC 96; Dhirajbhai GorakhbhaiNayak Vs. State of Gujarat, (2003) 5 SCC 223; Thaman Kumar Vs. State ofU.T. of Chandigarh, (2003) 6 SCC 380; Krishnan Vs. State, (2003) 7 SCC 56; Khambam Raja Reddy & Anr. Vs. Public Prosecutor; High Court of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 239; State of u;P. Vs. Dinesh, (2009) 11 SCC 566; State of U.P. Vs. Bari Chand, (2009) 13 SCC 542; Abdul Sayeed Vs. State of M.P., (2010) JO SCC 259 and Bhajan Singh@Harbhajan Singh & Ors. Vs. State, 2011) 7 SCC 421].

44. In the present case, we do not find any major contradiction either in the evidence of the witnesses or any conflict in medical or ocular evidence which would tilt the balance in favour of the respondents. The minor improvements, embellishments etc., apart from being far yield of human faculties are insignificant and ought to be ignored since the evidence of the witnesses otherwise overwhelmingly corroborate each other in material particulars.

45. The High Court has also noted that the deceased was a person with crirninal antecedents and had fired at many persons, including one Bashira, and hence could have been targeted and killed by any of his enemies. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred on this point since there was no such evidence brought on record and merely certain suggestions were made to PWl regarding this fact during his cross-examination, which were denied. Moreover, it was also submitted that in the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., they have stated that the deceased was a police mukhbir (informant) and not that he had criminal antecedents. Be that as it may, we would like to refrain from any form of conjecture on this point. In the present case, the prosecution has not sought to prove its claim on the basis of circumstantial evidence which as a rule needs to be conclusive, excluding any possible hypothesis of innocence of the accused. In the present case, it is not incumbent on the prosecution to discharge such burden to rule out every possible hypothesis inconsistent with the guilt of the accused or consistent with the guilt of any other person.

46. It has next been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that there was no immediate motive with the respondents to commit the murder of the deceased. However, the Trial Court found that there was sufficient motive with the accused persons to commit the murder of the deceased since the deceased had defeated accused Harcharan in the Pradhan elections, thus putting an end to his position as Pradhan for the last 28-30 years. The long nursed feeling of hatred and the simmering enmity between the family of the deceased and the accused persons most likely manifested itselfin the outburst of anger resulting in the murder of the deceased. We are not required to express any opinion on this point in the light of the evidence adduced by the direct witnesses to the incident. It is a settled legal proposition that even ifthe absence of motive, as alleged, is accepted that is of no consequence and pales into insignificance when direct evidence establishes the crime. Therefore, in case there is direct trustworthy evidence of witnesses as to commission c c of an offence, motive loses its significance. Therefore, ifthe genesis of the motive of the occurrence is not proved, the ocular testimony of the witnesses as to the occurrence could not be discarded only on the ground of absence of motive, if otherwise the evidence is worthy of reliance. [Bari Shankar Vs. State ofU.P., (1996) 9 SCC 40; Bikau Pandey & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar, (2003) 12 SCC 616; State of U.P. Vs. Kishanpal & Ors., (2008) 16 SCC 73; Abu Thakir & Ors. Vs. State ofTamil Nadu, (2010) 5 SCC 91 and Bipin Kumar Monda! Vs. State of West Bengal; (2010) 12 SCC 91].

47. The next line of contention taken by the I.earned counsel for the respondents is that the recovery evidence was false and fabricated. We feel no need to address this issue since it had already been validly discarded by the Trial court while convicting the respondents. In any case, it is an established proposition of law that mere non-recovery of weapon does not falsify the prosecution case where there is ample unimpeachable ocular evidence. [See Lakahan Sao Vs. State ofBihar and Anr., (2000) 9 SCC 82; State ofRa,jasthan Vs. Arjun Singh & Ors., (2011) 9 SCC 115 and Man.iit Singh and Anr. Vs. State of Pun.iab, (2013) 12 sec 746].

48. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that material questions regarding marriage, on which the prosecution had allegedly relied upon, were not put to the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., thereby causing great prejudice to them. We feel that there is no weight in this submission of the learned counsel for the respondents since the purpose of Section 313 is only to bring the attention of the accused to all the inculpatory pieces of evidence to give him an opportunity to offer an explanation ifhe chooses to do so. As has been succinctly held by this Court in Raj Kumar Singh@ Raju @ Batya Vs. State ofRa.iasthan, (2013) 5 SCC 722: "In a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the accused person under Section 313 Cr.P.C., is to meet the requirement of the principles ofnaturaljustice i.e. audi alterwn partem. This means that the accused may be asked to furnish some explanation as regards the incriminating circumstances associated with him, and the court must take note of such explanation."

49. We feel that no such prejudice has been caused to the accused on account of the failure of this Court to examine them under Section 313 on the facts alleged by the prosecution since they were not incriminating in nature. In any case, Nar Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (201 S) 1 SCC 496, is an authority for the proposition that accused is not per se entitled for acquittal on the ground ofnon-compliance of mandatory provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C.

50. The learned counsel for the respondents has also sought to assail the prosecution version on the ground of lack of independent witnesses. We are not impressed by this submission in the light of the observations made by this Court in Darya Singh Vs. State of Pun.jab, AIR 1965 SC 328 = 1964(7) SCR 397, wherein it was observed: "It is well-known that in villages where murders are committed as a result of factions existing in the village or in consequence of family feuds, independent villagers arc generally reluctant to give evidence because they are afraid that giving evidence might invite the wrath of the assailants and might expose them to very serious risks. It is quite true that it is the duty of a citizen to assist the prosecution by giving evidence and helping the administration of criminal law to bring the offender to book, but it would be wholly unrealistic to suggest that if the prosecution is not able to bring independent witnesses to the Court because they are afraid to give evidence, that itself should be treated as an infirmity in the prosecution case so as to justify the defence contention that the evidence actually adduced should be disbelieved on that ground alone without examining its merits."

51. Similarly, in RaghubirSingh Vs. State ofU.P., (1972) 3 SCC 79, it was held that the prosecution is not bound to produce al I the witnesses c said to have seen the occurrence. Material witnesses considered necessary by the prosecution for unfolding the prosecution story alone need be produced without unnecessary and redundant multiplication of witnesses. In this connection, general reluctance of an ·average villager to appear as a witness and get himself involved in cases of rival village factions when tempers on both sides are running high, has to be borne in mind.

52. Further, in Appabhai and Anr. Vs. State ofGu_jarat, 1988 c Supp (I) SCC 241, this Court has observed : "Experience reminds us that civilized people are generally insensitive when a crime is committed even in their presence. They withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante. They keep themselves away from the Court unless it is inevitable. They think that crime like civil dispute is between two individuals or parties and they should not involve themselves. This kind of apathy of the general public is indeed unfortunate, but it is there everywhere whether in village life, towns or cities. One cannot ignore this handicap with which the investigating agency has to discharge its duties. The Court, therefore, instead of doubting the prosecution case for want of independent witness must consider the broad spectrum of the prosecution version and then search for the nugget of truth with due regard to probability, if any, suggested by the accused."

53. Next, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the site plan belies the prosecution claim in view of the height of agricultural crops, as PWl, PW2 and PW5 could not have seen the incident and more precisely as to which accused was doing what. However, when we examine the deposition of PWS, it appears that there was some disparity in the height of the agricultural crops. While some crops were waist high, others were only as high as the knees. Hence, there is not much force in this submission of the learned counsel for the respondents either. Besides, the judgment of this Court in Prithvi Vs. Mam Raj, (2004) 13 SCC 279, is an authority for the proposition that site plan is not a ground to disbelieve the otherwise credible testimony of eye-witnesses.

54. Finally, it has been submitted by the counsel for the respondents , that the prosecution story smacked of fabrication in that it was not possible for the prosecution witnesses to depose accurately as to the dragging of the body of the deceased by the respondents by nine steps on the ground. We find no force in this submission in the light of the position oflaw laid down by this Court in Leela Ram Vs. State ofHaryana (supra).

55. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment passed by the High Court. Having regard to the evidence on record, the view expressed by the High Court, in our opinion, is not a plausible one. On the other hand, the trial court has correctly analyzed the material on record in the factual as well as legal perspectives to arrive at its conclusion. The Judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Mathura, thus stand restored. The respondents are hereby directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a week, failing which the learned Sessions Judge concerned shall take prompt steps to put the respondents .accused back in jail to undergo the sentence awarded to them. Devika Gujral Appeal allowed.